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Preface 
One of the few memories from my introductory philosophy course iti college-
over 35 years ago-is the parable of the blind men and the elephant. 
Four blind men come across an elephant. They decide to feel 
the elephant to determine what sort of creature it is. One blind man 
feels the back leg of the elephant. He says, "An elephan t is like a 
tree." The second blind man feels the trunk. He says, "An elephant 
is like a snake." The third blind man feels the tail. He says, "An ele-
phant is like a rope." The fourth blind man is afraid. He doesn't feel 
the elephant at all. 
The three blind men argue a long time about what an ele-
phant is and based on their own personal experience each is right.1 
This affected me greatly, when I first heard it at age 18, and it h as stayed 
with me to this day. It seems to explain so much of our social, intrapsychic, 
political, and cultural behavior, especially the "disconnects" we all fre-
quently experience in everyday work and professional life. When I started 
writing about the meretricious allure of "ordinary common sense" in legal 
theory,2 I realized that that parable helped explain our distorted thinking 
processes that have led to such incoherence in, for example, our insanity 
defense policies.3 
When I read the manuscript of Bruce Arrigo's brilliant new book, Pun-
ishing the Mentally Ill: A Critical Analysis of Law and Psychiatry, the parable 
came back to me in a very different way. For what Professor Arrigo has done 
is to expose the fa ilures and shortcomings of those methodologies that insist 
on Looking at the "men tal health system" through one perspective ·only-be 
th at the clinical, the legal, the behavioral, the empirical, the political, or the 
theoretical. Professor Arrigo-who demonstrates in this book a prodigious 
knowledge of all of these approaches- aims to do more, and he sets out that 
aim clearly. · 
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In the first pages of his Introduction he says this: 
I am interested in exploring the depths of punishment enacted 
first unconsciously in symbolic form and subsequently legitimized, 
knowingly or not, in socia l effect. In other words, this project seeks 
to link clinicolgeal practices (e.g., predicting dangerousness, execut-
ing the menta lly ill) with unspoken desires (e.g., the metaphysics of 
presence, the social control thesis), revealing how ideology and c ir-
cumscribed knowledge inform the behavior of law and psychiatry.◄ 
His thesis is that we cannot possibly understand the mental health system 
without confronting ideology, desires, and unconscious imagery. He also argues 
that this perception controls whether we are looking at civil or criminal mental 
disability law, at institutional or community mental disability law policy, or 
questions of mental health advocacy. And I agree. By framing his arguments as 
he does, he recognizes that what is rea lly going on in mental disability policy 
decision-making is complex, and is informed by a discourse that is highly depen-
dent on our understanding of the depths of our punitive urges, and the roots of 
our need to control those perceived to be deviant.5 
Professor Arrigo shows how these attitudes inform our clinical policies and 
out legal policies, whether we are looking at involuntary civil commitment, the 
provision of community treatment, the right to refuse treatment, an insanity 
defense trial, or the decision making involved in determining whether a person 
with mental disability can be executed. By doing this, he forces us to leave the 
comfortably narrow cocoons of our own substantive specialties (and professional 
calling), and makes us understand how a set of unconsciously integrated atti-
tudes explains why we do what we do-especia lly in the name of the state- in 
the way we deal with persons with mental disability. 
I am interested in all of the topics chat Professor Arrigo has brought to the 
scholarly table, and have written about many of them.6 I was most interested, 
however, in his chapter on "the ethics of advocacy for the mentally ill." This is 
a topic that has been severely underconsidered over the years,7 and about which 
there has truly been little that is origina l or controversial. Professor Arrigo's the-
sis here is clear: "Each time the mentally ill (or their representatives) engage the 
law, they strengthen and bolster their dependence on it, and, further, become 
somewhat disempowered because of it."8 This, he concludes, establishes the "pro-
found paradox" faced by persons with mental disability: "to endure without 
rights (as the law has taken them away), or seek rights from the law, which, in 
turn, fortifies the power of the law."9 And this leads him to his ultimate question 
on this topic: 
If advocacy in mental health law is anchored by clinicolegal 
interpretations of rights, illness, competency, and the like, and if 
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confinement decisions hinge, fundamen tally, on an appeal to estab-
lished strucn,res of civil and criminal institutional authority, what 
room, if any, is legitimately left for the disparate voices of the psy-
chiatrically disordered? Indeed, given these constructed realit ies, on 
whose behalf is the advocacy truly init iated?10 
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This is, of course, very unsettling, perhaps more so to someone like me 
who spent 11 years represent ing persons with mental disabilities (3 as a Pub-
lic Defender, specializing in cases involving incompetency status determina-
tions and insanity trials, and 8 as director of the NJ Division of Mental Health 
Advocacy, a sta te-funded, subcabinet office vested with the power to provide 
legal representa tion in both individual and class action matters for persons 
with mental disability), who, for the past 17 years, has taugh t students, in both 
classroom and clinical settings, to do the same,11 and who employs different 
modes of Legal analysis as a means of expanding the rights of persons with men-
tal disabilities through mental health advocacy. 12 Professor Arrigo's arguments 
here "push the envelope" in directions new to interdisciplinary scholarship, 
and will, I hope, inaugurate a new and important dia logue in the mental 
health "rights community." 
For the past decade or so, I have focused my own writing on what 1 term 
sanism as well as what I term pretextualir:y. Simply put, sanism is an irrational 
prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that 
cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homo-
phobia, and ethnic bigotry. It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering 
practices. Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based 
predominantly on stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is 
sustained and perpetuated by our use of a lleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) 
and heuristic reason ing in an unconscious response to events both in everyday: 
life and in the legal process. 
And, "pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or explic-
itly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently mere-
tricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expen 
witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order 
to achieve desired ends." This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all partici-
pants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans 
participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times, per-
j urious and/or corrupt testifying.13 
I turned to these concepts as a way of explaining why and how mental dis-
ability law has developed as it has. And I believe that the perniciousness and 
malignance of these concepts do so explain that law, whether we are looking at 
assisted outpatient commitment law, sexually violent predator laws, assessing 
defendants' competence to plead guilty, the right of institutionalized patients to 
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sexual interaction, or any of the other "standard" topics of mental disability law 
about which courts decide cases and scholars write articles. 
l have sought-especially in my earlier writings of the topic-to explain 
the historical, religious, and political sources of sanism, and how, to a great 
extent, these sources still animate current attitudes and behaviors. 14 Bue, having 
said that, l always have wondered if there were still "something else" to be added 
to help solve chis most difficult of social policy puzzles. Professor A rrigo provides 
that "something else" in this book, and he does so clearly, provocatively, and 
persuasively. It is one that we will be ch inking about for a long, long time. 
Michael L. Perlin 
Professor, New York Law School 
